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V.—DISCUSSIONS.
NOTE ON THE PHILO8OPHY OF A SUPPOSITION.
SUPPOSITION may be defined, perhaps it would be more accurate to
say it may be described, negatively, for the purposes of this paper,
as a conception that is not taken to be fane. The criterion of truth
in the sense in whioh "tenth " is used here is the ordinary one of
agreement with facts. The phrase " not taken to be true " is in-
tended to include not only conceptions that go beyond what is
known, and in that sense are not taken to be true, but also con-
ceptions that are at varianoe with what is known, that is conceptions
that are known to be false, whioh obviously are not taken to be true:
in other words, conceptions that are not known to be true, and
oonoeptions that are known not to be true. The knowledge of
opposnes is one, and the opposite of supposition, as used here, is
a oonoeption that is taken to be true. The difference therefore
between suppositions and other conceptions is the way in whioh
they are viewed in relation to facts.
Suppositions as here used may be divided into two classes:—
I. Suppositions made for their own sake—suppositions that have
their ends within themselves.
II. Suppositions made for some other reason—suppositions that
are made for the sake of some extrinsic end, in relation to
which they are meant.
Putting on one side for the moment the first division—the sup-
positions that are ends in themselves—the second division—the
suppositions that are means—may be subdivided teleologically, in
relation to the ends they subserve. So divided, they fall into two
1. Practical suppositions framed for the guidanoe of action, the
end of whioh is the good. By the good in this connexion is meant
not the ethically good, but the psychologically good, in other words
not only what ought to be desired, but what can be desired.
2. Speculative or scientific suppositions framed to help in the
attainment of truth, the end of which is, of course, the true.
It would be unreal to insist on making these divisions quite
mutually exclusive. In many oases a supposition may have more
aspects than one, and in these cases it should be classed according
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suppositions teleologioally is that the construction and the de-
velopment of the ideal content of the supposition is determined
throughout by the end it subserves, whether that end be imma-
nent or extrinsic. This appears if each of the classes mentioned
is considered a little more closely. First, as to suppositions that
have as their end the good, or, what are called here, practical
suppositions; a supposition framed for the guidance of conduct is
an ideal forecast of the result of following a certain line of action.
Out of this arises one great limitation that attaches to practical
suppositions: they deal only with the future. Practical thought
so far as it is practical never looks back. The irrevooableness of
the past makes thought about the past speculative, not practical.
The moving finger writes and, having writ,
Moves on. Nor all your piety .nor wit
Can lure it back to cancel half a line,
NOT all your tears wash out a word of i t
Begrets are vain things ; from the point of view here in question,
that is .final. The tears that are shed over spilt milk are idle tears,
though it may well be that, from the speculative point of view, their
uselessness is an added sorrow. The future is the province of
practical suppositions, but within this province practical supposi-
tions are further circumscribed by a limitation that makes the area
proper to them but a small part of the future. The aspect, under
which they regard the future, is the future as it can ba controlled
or modified by the agent. Man can enter into the future as an
influence of change only along the linee of the practicable, and in
relation to a given man, at a given moment, the lines open must
ever be very limited. About the impracticable there is no delibera-
tion, and this limitation attaches to the suppositions under consid-
eration, as forming part of the mechanism of deliberation. Looking
along the lines of action open to him, the agent in reflective ohoioe
may go over the possibilities, and say to himself, If I do this, the
results will be so and so; if I do that, the results will be so and
so. This is the formula according to which such suppositions are
made. When the suppositions are allowed to develop into their
results, the agent may guide himself, wholly or partially, by the
contemplated results, as to which supposition he will make actual
In determining practical judgment the development of each sup-
position will have value according to its reality and comprehen-
siveness.
Games of skill illustrate well the function of a practical supposi-
tion.. In a game of chess, for instance, the player has his choice
of a certain limited number of moves. So far as it is rational, his
choice is determined by forecasting the results of each move and
making the move that promises best. There is a struggle for
existence, as it were, amongst the possibilities, the possibility
finally actualised is reached through a series of rejected supposi-
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relation to aotion seems to be most consciously done when one is a
beginner or lacks skill in the department of action in question.
With skill or experience the process is less and less consciously
gone through. Great skill or great experience probably leads to
almost instinctive judgment
Practical suppositions belong to the intellectual aspect of aotion.
It is not intended to overemphasise this aspect. Energy and
decisiveness, for example, tell more perhaps in aotion than insight.
Even when insight is fully present, the life of aotion involves a
great many leaps in the dark : the data for insight to work on are
often wanting, it is a mere chance whether the event be brilliant
success or disastrous failure. Life is only in part a game of skill,
chance has always to be reckoned with, even when the game is
most quietly played. The oourage to play for great stakes is an
element in greatness, but often it has no more to do with intelleot
than the gambler's oast of a die.
In giving an account of practical suppositions in relation to
aotion, it may be well to notice a limitation to their availability
on theoretical grounds in certain cases in which their use might
otherwise seem appropriate. In moral action on the doctrine that
morality is intrinsic, and not dependent on consequences, praotioal
suppositions ought not to determine conduot. But admittedly on
this theory of ethics, morality leaves many things indeterminate,
and in relation to them appeal to expediency is legitimate. No
one, as has been pointed out, can say that consequences are irrele-
vant in ethics who allows, as all intuitionists do, that prudenoe is a
cardinal virtue. Not only so, but intuitional moralists allow that
outside the class of cases where aotion may be legitimately guided
by expediency, and even where consequenoes do not determine
morality, they may rightly be used as a test of the intrinsic
character of aotion, when the direct determination of the intrinsic
character presents difficulties. By their fruits you shall know them
is a principle, though not the principle of intuitional morality.
Taking up next suppositions that are made for the attain-
ment of truth—suppositions that are means in relation to the end,
truth. A supposition of this sort has a well-recognised name of
its own: it is called a hypothesis. Hypotheses may be divided
into two olasses on an important principle of division pointed out
by Mr. Venn in his Empirical Logic. In knowledge of truth
there may be advance in either of two ways, as a logician would
say, by way of extension or by way of intension. To put the same
thing less technically, advance in truth may be made by addition,
i.e., knowing more, or realisation, i.e., knowing better.
Hypotheses directed towards the realisation of truth are called
by Mr. Venn, Illustrative.
Hypotheses directed towards the discovery of truth are called
by Mr. Venn, Constructive.
Illustrative hypotheses deal with the application of known












NOTE ON THE PHILOSOPHY OP A SUPPOSITION. 505
meaning of the known. Constructive hypotheses are simply
guesses at unknown principles. Their great function is as an
instrument in discovery.
Illustrative hypotheses and constructive hypotheses are subject
to different conditions. And once more it will be found that the
conditions that attach to the suppositions under discussion arise
from the ends they respectively subserve.
Illustrative hypotheses, because they aim merely at illustration,
may not only go beyond truth, but even against truth, or against
possibility. In the teaching of physical science, for example,
untrue and impossible suppositions are freely used. Thus, in ex-
plaining the principle of the pendulum, a teacher might say if the
pendulum is swung under certain conditions, in a perfect vacuum,
and so that there is no friction, it will swing for ever, though the
complete removal of air, and the complete removal of Motion are
alike physically impossible. Again, the present writer has heard
Sir Bobert Ball, in an astronomical lecture, when speaking of the
fact that the transmission of light is not instantaneous, but takes
a certain time, make the supposition that if an observer were to
recede from the earth more rapidly than the rate at whioh light
travels, that observer would see the events of the earth's history
repeat themselves but repeat themselves in an order the reverse
of actual occurrence, in other words, backwards. This couple of
examples will sufficiently remind the reader how little regard
to truth or practicability illustrative hypotheses need pay. An
illustrative hypothesis is not limited even by the metaphysical
conditions of the possible. Thus in a treatise on Ethics written
from the scholastic standpoint, the student may find an illustrative
hypothesis of this sort: If Ood had not commanded men to do
what is right, what obligation would attach to the natural law?
The ' if' here introduces a supposition that the writer of the treatise
regards as at variance with metaphysical possibility. But this in
no way prejudices it as an illustration. An illustration, if it is to
illustrate, should be quite dear and definite, but it need not be
and is no better for being a faot. There may be much virtue in
an " if" even if that virtue is not truth.
Constructive hypotheses, the second subdivision of suppositions
that have truth as their end, are subject to much more stringent
conditions. A constructive hypothesis is a guess at the truth.
It is a tentative assumption made in the hope that it will turn out
to be true. And from this arise the conditions of a valid hypothesis
as they are laid down in logical text-books. Truths must be in
harmony with themselves and with each other ; they must be, as
it has been put, internally and externally consistent A construc-
tive hypothesis unlike an illustrative cannot be at variance with
possibility. What is impossible cannot be even provisionally taken
as true. A constructive hypothesis unlike an illustrative cannot
be at variance with faot: truth must be in harmony with truth.
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most have these characteristics of truth ; that it is possible in it-
self, and compatible with other truths. An untrue or an impossible
supposition may lead to the discovery of truth, but not direotly.
If the alternatives are limited, to show that one or more is untrue
or impossible is a help as limiting investigation, and may lead to
the truth if only one alternative is left not disproved. Every in-
direct proof is an example, as Ueberweg points out, of reaching
truth by way of a false supposition. The extensive use of indirect
proof shows that when error is conceived clearly enough to be-
developed into its consequences it tends to its own destruction : as
Bacon says, truth will sooner come out of error than out of con-
fusion.
The last class of suppositions to be considered is suppositions
that are not made as means, but for their own sake—their ends-
are immanent. Examples of suppositions of this sort are to be
found in what may be called artistic suppositions—that is supposi-
tions that are made and developed, because they appeal to the
sense of beauty, the sense of humour, or what other feeling
prompts to artistic activity. And in order to be true to facts,
artistio supposition in this connexion must be taken widely
enough to include not only artistio masterpieces, but the humblest
efforts of the creative instinot, even a passing fanoy that never
finds expression; because, philosophically, the explanation of the
crudest narrative that a child ever told its companion, prefaced
with the magio words "once upon a time," or the idlest day
dream, gone almost before its presence is realised, and the finest,
story in the world, is the same. To prevent misapprehension
it may be well to remind the reader that it is the theory of a
supposition this paper is concerned with, not the theory of art..
Not every product of artistio activity is a supposition. A supposi-
tion is representative in character. Some of the fine arts are not
even apparently representative: neither architecture nor music,
for example, are representative arts. But while the philosophy
of a supposition and the theory of art are two things, does not the
foregoing discussion seem to throw some light on two theoriss
of representative art, the theory of realism, and the didactic
theory ? The element of error in realism is in making the artistio
supposition a means to the scientific end, truth. The element of
error in didactic art is in making the artistio supposition a means
to the practical end, good. The artistic supposition, the practical
supposition, and the scientific supposition are three things, subject
to different conditions, and to the extent to which they are identi-.
fied, there is error. The true, the good, the beautiful may in last
analysis be connected intimately, but suppositions framed in view
of the true, the good, the beautiful are different, they are subject to*
different conditions, and developed according to different laws.
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